By Anthony Branch,
CRRC-Armenia
International
Fellow
While
the recent installment of Nikol Pashinyan as Prime Minister is perhaps the most
significant governmental change since the independence of Armenia, the security
challenges and geopolitical realities remain the same. The Nagorno-Karabakh
conflict continues in stagnation, Turkey’s aggressive rhetoric and partnership
with Azerbaijan is unchanged, and the energy geopolitical partnership between
Azerbaijan, Georgia, and Turkey is increasing. Though much remains the same, it
is important to analyze and consider specific challenges the new Armenian government
may face.
According to data from the Caucasus Research Resource Center – Armenia Foundation, Armenians still view Azerbaijan as the main enemy of the country. Azerbaijan has recently been reported moving troops and military equipment near the line of contact in Nagorno-Karabakh. The Aliyev regime recently threatened to strike the Armenian nuclear energy facility. With low crude oil prices 2015-2017, and after a demonstration of improved military aptitude in April 2016, Azerbaijan has purchased more arms from Russia. On June 20th 2018, the Azeri government published a video claiming to have conducted a “military operation” in Nakhchivan. In addition, Azerbaijan has been known to conduct joint-military exercises with Turkey in the Nakhchivan exclave.
While
it is unlikely that Azerbaijan will outright attack the territory of the
Republic of Armenia considering its CSTO
(Collective Security Treaty Organization) agreement with Russia, it is less
predictable to determine when, or if, Azerbaijan will launch an offensive on
Nagorno-Karabakh (as Nagorno-Karabakh is not covered in the CSTO). It is worth
considering global oil prices when thinking about a possible Azeri offensive on
Nagorno-Karabakh. Azerbaijan relies on its oil and natural gas as its primary source of income. During
the April 2016 war, crude oil prices were the lowest in over ten years, crippling the Azerbaijani economy. As
seen in the Iraq-Iran war, and countless other examples, authoritarian leaders
tend to seek out foreign adventures when there is domestic political or
economic strife. OPEC (Organization of the Petroleum Exporting Countries)
recently held a meeting pushing to increase production, which will drive crude oil prices back down. Amidst
the OPEC decision and the recent activity on the line of contact and in
Nakhchivan, it is reasonable to speculate an impending offensive.
For
Armenia, it is difficult to change the geopolitical balance of the region. A
landlocked and dependent country with two of its borders closed, it’s been
under a modern siege from the east and west for decades. In a successful effort
to increase mutual state income and tighten that siege against Armenia, Baku
and Ankara have several energy cooperatives that include Georgia; most notably,
the Trans-Anadolu Pipeline (TANAP). For Turkey and Azerbaijan, the geopolitical balance
in the region is frozen due to mutual
and collective defense pacts, thus the most effective way to shift the balance is to
utilize Azeri controlled Caspian Sea oil and natural gas to enrich Azerbaijan, Georgia, and
Turkey financially and diplomatically. By including Georgia as an integral
beneficiary of energy projects, it allows for the shifting of Georgia’s alignment to
Turkey and Azerbaijan, compromising the critical position of Georgia’s
neutrality in the regional geopolitical balance.
How
can Armenia rebalance this Turkish-Azerbaijani energy-geopolitical
dynamic? A new energy initiative involving Russia, Georgia, Armenia, and Iran
can offset some of the shift. The North-South Energy Corridor project would bring energy from Russia down to Iran
through Georgia and Armenia, like a Caucasus Tic-Tac-Toe board, rebalancing
Georgia’s posture, while filling Armenia’s coffers. In addition, Armenia should
capitalize on the euphoria of its recent revolution to advance diplomatic relations with the Georgian government and its citizens.
While
Mr. Pashinyan has focused his efforts on reformation of Armenian domestic
policy, he should reassess the 2007 Armenian national security doctrine to define and promote Armenia’s national security
interests. In revising the doctrine, Pashinyan and his security council should
outline Armenia’s energy security strategy. Pashinyan’s selection of Armen Grigoryan for National Security Council Chief, a notable
thought leader and scholar of Armenian national security, should be effective in
leading the Council to author a timely and comprehensive doctrine.
The South Caucasus
geopolitical balance will continue to be a constant security challenge for
Armenia. At the moment, it appears that Azerbaijan and Turkey are shifting the
balance through military advancements, and a plurality of benefits from
multi-national energy projects. Regardless, Armenia may have the opportunity to
rebalance the dynamic through the North-South Energy Corridor and through
effective diplomacy between Armenia and Georgia. While the geopolitical dynamic
in the South Caucasus has remained largely the same, the subtle nuances in
marginal shifts are important to consider.
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